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There is substantial agreement within the environmental movement that 
there is no better kind of government and society than a democracy. 
Authoritarian and dictatorial kinds of government are ruled out. To be 
sure, conditions in some democracies might deteriorate to such an extent 
that there is a real threat that the authoritarian forms of government and 
society will come to be. I think that such a possibility is remote. There are 
presently many kinds of democracy and, with minor changes, they can 
adapt as necessary to meet demands to lower environmental impacts. 
However, there are “doomsday prophets” who think that uninhibited 
economic expansion could require drastic laws to be imposed, whatever 
the contrary opinion of the majority of people. In all democracies, 
regardless of kind, there has to be access to accurate information. This 
becomes more difficult in so-called advanced nations, since, in many, the 
control of mass media tends to be in the hands of large private firms 
whose interests might not be consistent with the basic requirements and 
principles of democracy. 
 
I use the phrase “kind of democracy” in a wide sense, so that I can talk 
about various kinds and subkinds of democracy. There are many forms of 
government. We could call democracy, in the most general sense, a form 
of government by the people that protects individual rights and community 
well being. But at a more specific, concrete level, given demands and 
differences in ecosystem and so on, we have the gift of many varieties of 
democracy to discuss. Theorists of democracy who are concerned about 
the ecological crisis are questioning whether the present subkinds of 
democracy are the best suited for the immense tasks ahead that are 
required to cope with this crisis. 
 
Many seem to think that democracy is the best way to govern ourselves; 
but how can popular democracies cope with crises that might not be 
acknowledged by their leaders and mainstream media? And when a crisis 
becomes severe, how can leaders react without centralizing control? This 
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process happens, as we have seen recently, with nations that go on a war 
footing. Civil rights and other liberties can be compromised, local control 
lost. What kinds of democracies are necessary, and more specifically for 
me, what about the kind of democracy we have in Norway? Is our kind of 
democracy fit to meet the challenges ahead? 
 
Some pessimism about the outlook for significant change of ecological 
policies may, in part, be due to the tacit assumption that nothing can or 
will change in the way that democracies work today. For many of us, it is 
profitable to study changes contemplated by authors specializing in this 
topic. In what follows, I will concentrate on the work by John S. Dryzek 
as it is presented in his book, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and 
Political Science.1  He writes: 
Discursive democracy is woven here from threads supplied by the classical 
(Aristotelian) model of politics, participatory democracy, communicative action, 
practical reason, and critical theory. The product, or so I shall argue, is a coherent, 
integrative, and attractive program for politics, public policy, and political science.2
Dryzek maintains that, over the first centuries, rationality has come to 
demand two things:  
The first is effective instrumental action; instrumental rationality may be defined in 
terms of the capacity to devise, select, and effect good means to clarified ends. The 
second is the idea that [there are] rational choices concerning theories and beliefs 
about matters of fact, and even about values and morals . . . 3  
This is characteristic of a subkind of democracy that can be overcome by 
inability to cope with deep change. But there is another characteristic that 
goes together with the dominance of instrumental rationality, namely what 
Dryzek calls “objectivism.” The representatives of the instrumental 
rationality “conjure up a clean and orderly world where modern science, 
technology, and economics flourish. However, I shall argue that modernity 
also allows some very different possibilities in polity, economy, and 
society.”4 Dryzek doesn’t doubt that there are important subkinds of 
democracy that will save what is valuable in rationality as opposed to 
irrationality. There are subkinds of democracy that can help nurture care 
for nature and that can encourage change to sustainable social practices 
and economies and that can gauge their progress by shifting from standard 
of living to quality of life and all this implies.  
 
The least radical escape from a democracy where instrumental rationality 
and objectivism dominate is, according to Dryzek, the Popperian open 
society in which instrumental rationalists can freely criticize one another’s 
designs, and in which objectivists freely criticize one another’s theories. 
But that is not enough. 
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The most radical escape “repudiates human reason, minimally in some 
specified domain, but sometimes more universally.”5 It is natural here to 
think of Paul Feyerabend and his joyful escape from the tyranny of 
viewing Western science as the only source of knowledge. But Dryzek 
promotes a third escape route. “. . . discursive and democratic rationality 
may regulate the remnants of instrumental rationality and replace 
objectivism.”6 The route goes through participatory democracy to 
discursive democracy. The first implies substantial strengthening of 
political communities that govern themselves and downscaling the 
intervention of representatives. The requirement is to participate also in 
sustained debates concerning conflicting programs of non-local character. 
As Dryzek sees it, this goes against the idea of liberal democracy where 
there is no public interest other than the sum of the interests of individuals. 
Public communal reasoning toward policy positions via consensus on 
normative positions moves the quality of decisions to the centre of the 
debate. The consensus is “on what is to be done while differing about 
why.”7  
 
It is now necessary to introduce another of Dryzek’s terms, “discursive 
design.” It is “a social institution around which the expectations of a 
number of actors converge. . . . a site for recurrent communicative 
interaction.” 8Participants should be reflectively and discursively free to 
override any rules of procedure. 
 
A concrete issue may make clearer what Dryzek proposes: Take for 
example the whaling issue: “Actors with a stake in the whaling issue 
include national governments (both whalers and nonwhalers), 
environmental groups . . ., aboriginal whalers . . ., commercial whalers, 
commercial whale watchers, consumers of whale products, scientists . . ., 
and international organizations such as the IWC and the United Nations.” 
9As I understand it, all these actors should come together regularly and on 
equal footing. 
 
Having been active in the whaling issue for ten years, I can confidently 
say that a meeting of representatives of all the actor groups would be a 
good thing. The location of a willing, competent, and credible third party, 
a requirement mentioned by Dryzek, would not pose any problem. 
Sweden, although opposed to whaling, is nevertheless friendly towards 
Norway, and would be willing to assist. As to compensation to whalers, 
the only realistic solution is to guarantee them work in the seas. 
 
I asked Norwegian whalers whether they would accept jobs as inspectors 
to prevent illegal fishing. There is a great need for enforcement here. It is 
probable that such an arrangement would have been acceptable to the 
The Trumpeter 12 
 
 
whalers in the 1980s, when the plan was aired. However, in political 
circles it was said to be “politically impossible” to invite whalers to be 
trained as inspectors. Such special arrangements for particular groups have 
no precedents. My conclusion: Discursive design and recurrent 
communicative interaction would increase the chances of constructive 
solutions in moderately sharp conflicts, such as that of whaling. Among 
the practical obstacles, I should mention, are the costs for all actors to 
come together to meet in person. In many cases, it would be sufficient to 
use certain modern non-personal means of close interaction. More 
generally, my conclusion is that Dryzek points to a largely neglected issue: 
creative thinking about changing the main features of contemporary kinds 
of democracy. 
 
What is the chance that present democracies might change and what is the 
chance that green values will benefit from these changes? In some 
countries, changes are not improbable. There is a lot of dissatisfaction 
with existing conditions. But in Norway, as in many other countries, 
politicians tend to agree that the population is unprepared for significantly 
more responsible and demanding ecological policies. A great upsurge of 
participatory democratic activism today might or might not strengthen the 
urge for such policies. This is not predictable. 
 
Dryzek concludes his book by expressing his conviction that discursive 
democracy and its development depends upon “critical theory,”10 and 
“multifaceted and relentless critique.”11 Here he certainly finds support 
from people in the deep ecology movement, but less in the environmental 
movement as a whole. Fortunately, able Green political theorists are 
gradually making themselves better known. It is my feeling that, as a plain 
environmental activist, it is important to keep up the interest, to introduce 
various issues in discussions, to talk about what is gained and what is lost, 
to encourage people to make use of the opportunities they have to enjoy 
free nature, and to avoid making still more propaganda for what may be 
called overwhelmingly exciting nature, that is, places you only reach as 
tourists. Most people do not have much time to visit such places. They 
might desire to see them. However, the most firm basis for persistent 
activism may be a deep need for living in nature that is not dominated by 
man, however modest its reputation. And if not living there, at least being 
able to be there sometimes.  
 
I remember when being driven through Tokyo once, that there were 
endless queues of vehicles, with cement everywhere. But on a nearby 
vacant lot there was lush vegetation: Dandelions and other flowering 
plants that are mostly despised. But that characterization is a kind of 
conventional classification. What was really there was practically an 
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infinite variety of living beings with the capacity to flourish in an 
environment of exceptional difficulty, surrounded by square miles of big 
buildings. Speaking of species and subspecies, there were, of course, many 
plants there that are unknown to me as a Norwegian. I had a delightful 
time looking for plants. People seeing me through the windows of their 
cars could see my delight. In the internationally admired botanical garden 
in Tokyo, I could not help concentrating on plants looking like my 
“friends” from childhood in Norway. And yet, I was probably looking at 
least at subvarieties never seen by me before. There was a hidden 
otherness: to concentrate on this resulted in sometimes ignoring the 
extremely rare and strange looking celebrities for which the botanical 
garden is famous. 
 
What I am driving at here is only to remind us that a fondness for free 
nature can be fostered in children even in our imperfect democracies. 
Education should be in awareness and feeling as much as in intellectual 
smartness. In a natural setting some people see hundreds of things more 
than the average person. If they are used as teachers in natural settings, 
their very body language reveals their positive emotions for the world. 
Unfortunately, the selection of teachers is mainly dependent on the higher 
levels of school administration in a country. I have talked to assemblies of 
Norwegian teachers and I have insisted that if they decide that education 
must proceed differently, no upper level administration, not even the 
government itself, could block their efforts. They would succeed! There 
are not 10,000 teachers available to take over their jobs. 
 
Unfortunately, the motivation for significant changes is not strong enough 
among the majority of teachers. They complain, but seem to have too 
much to do within the present regime to organize effective resistance. 
Resistance! And the government goes primarily for continued economic 
growth. This in itself could be of value, if it were not understood to imply 
continued consumerism. The idea is still new or little known that the 
measure of economic growth is independent of level of domestic material 
and energy consumption. If the growth is three percent, it is compatible 
with a six percent increase or decrease in domestic consumption. A 
decrease could be caused by large scale co-operation with Third World 
efforts to overcome the world ecological crisis. For instance, producing a 
sufficient number of small hydroelectric installations to secure energy 
supply in Nepal; next, financing the stay of a sufficient number of 
Norwegians to partake in the proper use of the equipment for the first 
years; and finally, to instruct the Nepalese on how to start production, 
using this continuing energy supply, with a higher ecological quality than 
is now found in Norway. Other nations could do other things that they are 
good at. 




A similar misunderstanding may be present as to level of unemployment. 
A basic variable is level of labour intensity in the units of work, as 
opposed to capital intensity. The employment of one more worker in the 
production of something might require a capital investment of ten 
thousand or even ten million Norwegian Crowns. The production of 
aluminum is highly capital intensive in this sense. Whereas hiring a person 
to look after very old people, who manage imperfectly to live by 
themselves, may only be the cost of transport and food. Both are examples 
of economic production, that is, production of goods and services. 
 
A democracy with an increased budget devoted to consumption outside its 
own country, and increased labour intensity, requires some changes in 
value priorities on the part of a significant percentage of its population. It 
requires a minority who agree with these goals and are willing to use some 
of their time to “stand up” and work for their realization. Recent 
developments have seen an increase of social activism by women. They 
“stand up” in social conflicts and are on the average less charmed with 
power gained through directing material production. I am not going into 
the questions of how to proceed in detail, but point to the likelihood that 
the kinds of means we use will not generally change our kind of 
democracy in Norway. We will first change the value priorities within the 
democracy we have. This will probably be true in many other democracies 
as well. Even if this is unlikely, the changes, as convincingly described by 
Dryzek, offer possibilities for major changes in how democracies might 
work more effectively, especially in relation to ecological responsibility 
and social justice. 
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